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JURISDICTION OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
TO SENTENCE
GEORGE N. STEVBNS*
Members of the Magistrates Association of the State of Washington
have reported difficulty in ascertaining the extent of their power to
impose sentences on persons found guilty of certain offenses because
of an apparent conflict in the statutory law of Washington. In order
to resolve this difficulty it is necessary to distinguish between the power
of a Justice of the Peace to hear and determine a particular case and
his power to impose sentence upon a finding of guilty
The Constitution of the State of Washington provides for Justices
of the Peace.' It further provides that the Justices of the Peace shall
have such powers, duties and jurisdiction as the Legislature may pre-
scribe.' Consequently, the source of authority with respect to what a
Justice of the Peace may or may not do is the Session Laws of the
State of Washington.
So far as the criminal jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace is
concerned, the basic expression of the Legislative intent is found in
what is now RCW 3.20.040:
"Justices of the Peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the superior
courts of all misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors committed in or which
may be tried in their respective counties Promded, That justices of the
peace in cities of the first class shall in no event impose greater punishment
than a fine of five hundred dollars, or imprisonment on the county jail for
six months, and justices of the peace other than those elected in cities of
of the first class shall in no event impose greater punishment than a fine of
one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for thirty days."
This statute does two things. First, it gives the Justice of the Peace
concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court of a/l misdemeanors
and gross misdemeanors committed in or which may be tried in their
respective counties. Second, it limits the power of Justices of the
Peace to impose punishment.
*Dean of the School of Law, University of Washington. An address delivered to
the Second Annual Meeting of the Magistrates Association of the State of Washington,
held at the University of Washington School of Law on September 17, 18, 19, 1953.
'WASH. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1 (1889).
2 WASH. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 10 (1889).
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A question of statutory construction is inevitable. Does the limita-
tion on the power to impose sentence constitute a limitation on the
power to hear and determine all misdemeanors and gross misde-
meanors? What was the legislative intent?
In view of the procedures established by the Legislature by those
statutes now known as RCW 10.04.030, 10.16.130 and 10.04.100, a
strong argument could be made that it was not the legislative intent
to limit the jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace to hear cases
involving misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors, but only to limit their
power to impose punishment.
"RCW 10.04.030 Hearing-Judgment. On the return of any warrant
issued by him, the justice shall docket the cause. Unless a continuance is
granted, he shall forthwith hear and determine the cause, and either acquit,
convict and punish, or if the offense proves to be one which should be tried
in the superior court, and is bailable, hold the offender to bail, or in default
of bail, commit him to jail, as the facts and law may justify
"RCW 10.16.130 Order for trial before justice. If it appears that an
offense has been committed of which a justice of the peace has jurisdiction,
and one which would be sufficiently punished by a fine not exceeding one
hundred dollars:
(1) If the magistrate having the complaint is a justice of the peace, he
shall cause the complaint to be altered and proceed as in like cases before a
justice of the peace, or
(2) If the magistrate is not a justice of the peace, he shall certify. the
papers, with a statement of the offense appearing to be proved, to the
nearest justice of the peace, and shall, by order, require the defendant and
the witnesses to furnish bonds, with sufficient sureties, to be approved by
the magistrate, for their appearance before the justice at the time and place
stated in the order. The justice shall proceed to the trail of the action as if
originally commenced before him.
"RCW 10.04.100 Verdict of guilty-Proceedings upon. If the defendant
is found guilty, the justice or the jury, as the case may be, shall assess
his punishment. If, in the opinion of the justice or the jury, as the case
may be, the punishment they are authorized to assess is not adequate to
the offense, they may so find, and thereupon the justice shall' order the
defendant to furnish a bond for his appearance in the superior court of the
county. He shall also require the witnesses to furnish bonds for their
appearances thereat and proceed as in proceedings by a committing
magistrate.
The first of these three sections empowers the Justice of the Peace
to look into the merits, and acquit, convice, punish, or send the case
up to the Superior Court if the offense proves to be one which should
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be tried there. The second clearly distinguishes between jurisdiction
to hear and determine and the power to impose sentence by its positive
instruction to the magistrate as to the place for trial. And the third
statute, in so many words, instructs the Justice of the Peace how to
proceed where, after he has heard and determined, he feels that the
punishment he is authorized to assess is not adequate. In each instance,
the power to look into the merits is assumed and procedures are set up
to make effective the separate and distinct limitation on the power
to impose sentence.
The legislative intent might well be ascertained from yet another
approach. The Legislature established the punishment for gross mis-
demeanors and misdemeanors when not otherwise fixed by statute
by general provisions in what are now RCW 9.92.0201 and 9.92.030.'
The maximum punishment under these statutes is well beyond the
maximums authorized by RCW 3.20.040. Substantive statutes, such
as those dealing with motor vehicles, provide that:
"Any person violating any provisions of this title for the violation of
which no penalty is prescribed, or for the violation of which a different
penalty is not imposed either by this title or by any other law of this state,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 5
Common sense dictates the conclusion that it certainly was not the
legislative intent to deprive the Justices of the Peace of jurisdiction
to hear and determine misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor cases
simply because the maximum penalty was beyond the power of the
Justices of the Peace to impose.
First, suppose that the maximum penalty provided by law for a mis-
demeanor or gross misdemeanor is greater than the maximum punish-
ment which a Justice of the Peace is authorized to impose under RCW
3.20.040. On such a set of facts, does a Justice of the Peace have the
jurisdiction to hear and determine the guilt or innocence of a person
8 RCW 9.92.020 Punishment for gross misdemeanor when not fixed by statue.
Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor for which no punishment is prescribed
in any statute in force at the time of conviction and sentence, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars, or by both.
4RCW 9.92.030 Punishment for misdemeanor when not fixed by statute. Every
person convicted of a misdemeanor for which no punishment is prescribed by any
statute in force at the time of conviction and sentence, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more than ninety days, or by a fine of not more than
two hundred and fifty dollars.
Note that this statute does not contain the "or both" authorization. State v. Low,
192 Wash. 631, 74 P.2d 458 (1937) held that the punishment authorized under this
section is fine or imprisonment, but not both.
5 RCW 46.64.050.
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accused of the particular misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, in spite
of the limitation on his power to enforce the maximum penalty? This
very contention was made in State v. Davis.6 In this case the Justice of
the Peace had imposed a sentence of only $25, well within his power
under the proviso. In the language of the Court:
"Respondent further contends that the justice of the peace had no
jurisdiction to try him on the complaint made, for the reason that § 3 of
the statute of 1889 provides for a fine of not less than $25, nor more than
$200, or imprisonment for a period of not less than ten nor more than
nnety days. While it is true that, under Pierce Code, § 3071, Laws 1901,
p. 34, a justice of the peace may not impose a fine of more than $100,
nevertheless, we tlunk said section confers upon justices of the peace
jurisdiction of all misdemeanors, and that such justices are merely restricted
by said section to imposing a fine not exceeding $100, or imprisonment as
in said section stated. In this case the justice imposed a fine of $25, and
did not exceed his jurisdiction."
But, suppose the Justice of the Pehce imposes a sentence beyond
his power. Does this deprive him of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, provided it is a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor? This
question reached our Supreme Court in State ex rel. Rush v. Orton.7
The court held:
"The complaint in the justice court clearly charges a misdemeanor. The
justice of the peace had jurisdiction. *** The judgment of the justice of the
peace was clearly erroneous in imposing both the one hundred dollar fine
and the thirty days imprisonment. *** So, in the instant case, the justice
had jurisdiction, the case was heard, the defendant on his plea was adjudged
guilty; and the only question for determination by the superior court was
the legality of the sentence imposed. We hold that it was the duty of the
superior court, under the above-quoted statute, to remand the case to the
justice of the peace with instructions that a legal sentence be pronounced."
The decision in the Rusk case clearly distinguishes between juris-
diction to hear and determine and power to impose punishment, and
holds that the latter is not a limitation on the former. Error in the
imposition of sentence is not fatal to jurisdiction over the offense. The
case is sent back for a legal sentence.
When the case gets back to the Justice of the Peace he must decide
whether the punishment which he is authorized to impose is adequate.
If he feels that it is, he may enter judgment up to the maximum of the
proviso of RCW 3.20.040. However, if the justice, or the jury, as the
6 43 Wash. 116, 86 Pac. 201 (1906).
7 145 Wash. 289, 259 Pac. 1077 (1927).
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case may be, is of the opinion that the punishment which they are
authorized to impose is not adequate, they may so find and should
proceed, as the Legislature provided in what is now RCW 10.04.100,
to send the case to the Superior Court for more appropriate punishment.
Not only has this procedure been approved by our Supreme Court,'
but it has been definitely determined that such a procedure does not
constitute double jeopardy.'
Consequently, the answer to the first hypothetical is that so long as
the offense charged is a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor the Justice
of the Peace has jurisdiction to hear and determine the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, but his power to sentence upon a verdict of
guilty is limited by the proviso of RCW 3.20.040, and when his power
to punish is not adequate he must proceed in accordance with RCW
10.04.100 by sending the case to the Superior Court.
Will it make a difference if the minimum penalty established for the
particular misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor is greater than the
maximum penalty authorized under the proviso of RCW 3.20.040?
The legislative intent on this question is clear. Under RCW 10.16.-
130, Order for trial before a Justice, such a case should not be sent
to a Justice of the Peace, not because he does not have jurisdiction,
but because the offense is one for which the Justice of the Peace could
not impose an adequate punishment. But, suppose such a case is sent
to the Justice of the Peace.
Where a case starts before a Justice of the Peace, the Legislature
wisely provided under RCW 10.04.030 that the Justice of the Peace
should forthwith hear and determine the cause, and either acquit,
convict and punish, or if the offense proves to be one which should be
tried in the Superior Court, hold the offender to bail or commit him
to jail as the facts and the law may justify Here again he has power
to look into the merits, even though he may not have power to impose
punishment.
And finally, if at a hearing before the Justice of the Peace, the defend-
ant is found guilty, is not the Justice of the Peace in a position to say
that since the punishment he is authorized to assess is not adequate to
the offense, the defendant is ordered to furnish a bond for his appear-
ance in the Superior Court of the county under RCW 10.04.100?
8 State ex rel. Murphy v. Taylor, 101 Wash. 148, 172 Pac. 217 (1918), State v.
Friedlander, 141 Wash. 1, 250 Pac. 453 (1926).
9 State v. Friedlander, 141 Wash. 1, 250 Pac. 453 (1926), appeal dismissed 275
U.S. 573 (1927).
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Consequently, whether a case of this kind starts before a Justice
of the Peace or is improperly referred to him under RCW 10.16.130,
no harm seems to come of it, provided that the Justice of the Peace
does not himself impose a sentence. At least, no case in point has been
found.
Suppose, however, that the Justice of the Peace on the facts of this
second hypothetical finds the accused guilty and imposes a punishment
in accord with the offense and beyond the proviso of RCW 3.20.040.
Is this merely error in the sentence imposed? Under the reasoning of
the cases above referred to one might well come to such a conclusion.
However, in State ex rel Wagner v. Superior Court," our Supreme
Court held:
"The statute under which relator was prosecuted *** provides for a fine
of not less than $250, nor more than $1,000, for the offense of which
relator was convicted. ***
"It seems to us that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction of the
offense charged, since the law mandatorily required upon conviction a
fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars, and the justice of the peace
had jurisdiction to assess a fine of one hundred dollars only. It follows,
therefore, that it was a case the punishment for which as provided by law
he was unable to impose. ***
"*** It will be seen in the instant case that the relator was not tried
before a court of competent jurisdiction,, because the court was not compe-
tent to impose a fine of two hundred fifty dollars as required by law. It is
not a case where the court has only entered an erroneous judgment. If
the statute under which the relator was tried gave the court power to fine
in the amount of one hundred dollars or less, then its action would only be
erroneous because the amount imposed would be greater than its power
under the law. State v. Davis. But in this case, the court had no power
to hear the case, because it could not impose the sentence required by law."
This case holds that where the minimum sentence for violation of
a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor is greater than the maximum
sentence that a Justice of the Peace may impose under RCW 3.20.040,
the Justice of the Peace has no power to hear the case.
With all due respect to the Supreme Court in that case, I think it
failed to fully consider the legislative intent as expressed in the statutes
above cited, none of which were discussed in the opinion; nor does the
court distinguish between jurisdiction to hear and determine and power
to punish, in the light of the Washington statutes above referred to.
The decision should be limited to its facts. I doubt whether this case
10 144 Wash. 71,256 Pac. 784 (1927).
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would be authority for the contention that a Justice of the Peace has
no power to hear a case coming to him under RCW 10.04.030; 10.16.-
130 or 10.04.100 where he does not impose an illegal sentence but
properly sends the case along to the Superior Court. In fact, the
Supreme Court in discussing the Wagner case in a later opinion said:1
"*** It would seem that, in the prosecution of Mr. Wagner for violation
of the game laws, the Justice of the Peace did, in fact, have power, as a
committing magistrate, to hear the case, but, because of the sentence pro-
vided for by law, had no authority to find the accused guilty, but had
authority only to bind him over to the Superior Court for trial. It may
be that, in the opinion of this Court in the Wagner case, supra, the juris-
diction of the justice, as a committing magistrate, to hear the case, was
confused with the assumed jurisdiction of the justice to try the case, find
the accused guilty and impose sentence, which latter jurisdiction was
clearly lacking."
At this point then, we must draw the conclusion that where the mini-
mum punishment prescribed for a particular misdemeanor or gross
misdemeanor is beyond the power of a Justice of the Peace to impose
sentence because of the proviso of RCW 3.20.040, either the Justice
of the Peace, at worst, has no jurisdiction to hear the case, under the
Wagner decision, or, at best, may act as a committing magistrate, under
the dictum of the Hudet case.
What is the effect of this decisional law on, for example, RCW
46.56.010 which deals with the operation of motor vehicles while under
influence of intoxicants or drugs?
"Upon the first conviction for the violation of the provisions of this
section the court shall impose a fine of not less than fifty dollars or more
than five hundred dollars or not less than ten days or more than one year
in jail, or both such fine and imprisonment, and shall, in addition thereto,
revoke the operator's license of such person. Upon second or subsequent
conviction for a violation of the provisions of this section the court shall
impose a fine of not less than one hundred dollars or more than one thou-
sand dollars and not less than thirty days or more than one year in the
county jail, or both such fine and imprisonment, and shall, in addition
thereto, revoke the operator's license of such person."
The fine or imprisonment terms for a first conviction are clearly
within the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace both to hear and to
impose punishment under the Davis case. The minimum punishment
for a second conviction either by fine or imprisonment is the maximum
"In re Hulet, 159 Wash. 98, 102, 292 Pac. 430, 432 (1930).
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under the proviso of RCW 3.20.040. So, requirements of the Wagner
case are met, and the Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction both to hear
and to impose sentence, or refer the matter to the Superior Court for
more adequate punishment. But, the matter does not end here. The
penalty provisions of RCW 46.56.010 for both a first and second con-
viction state that the operator's license of such person be revoked. This
provision is mandatory, not discretionary. Consequently, under the
language of the Wagner case, and it is still law, the Justice of the Peace
has no jurisdiction over this offense since the law requires a sentence
upon conviction which the Justice of the Peace is not authorized to
impose under RCW 3.20.040, unless some other statute confers this
additional power on the Justice of the Peace. RCW 46.20.2 50 provides:
"Every court in fixing the penalty shall forthwith revoke the vehicle
operator's license of a person upon his conviction of any of the following
crimes.
(1) Manslaughter resulting from the operation of a m6tor vehicle;
(2) Perjury or the making of a false affidavit to the director under any
licensing law pertaining to motor vehicles or any other law of this,state
requnng the registration of motor vehicles or regulating their operation
on public highways;
(3) Any crime punishable as a felony under the motor vehicle laws of
this state or any other felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle
is used;
(4) Conviction or forfeiture of ball upon three charges of reckless
driving all within the preceding two years;
(5) A conviction of an operator of a motor vehicle, involved in an acci-
dent resulting in the death or injury of another person, upon a charge of
failing to stop and disclose his identity at the scene of the accident;
(6) Operating a vehicle upon the public highways of thus state while
under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor or of
any narcotic drug.
The foregoing offenses shall be in addition to any other offenses for
which revocation of a vehicle operator's license is by law provided.
Does this statute increase the power of Justices of the Peace to im-
pose sentences? Two opinions of the Attorney General say that a
Justice of the Peace has power under this statute to revoke an opera-
tor's license". However, neither opinion went into the question of the
validity of the enlargement of the Justices' of the Peace jurisdiction
to sentence in view of the proviso of RCW 3.20.040.
The problem boils down to this: Can the Legislature in Washington
12 1937-38 Op. AT'y. GEN. 235 and 1941-42 Op. ArtZ'y GEN. 229.
19531
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
increase the power of the Justice of the Peace to sentence in special
cases without amending the proviso of RCW 3.20.040?
The answer to this question is of vital importance to Justices of the
Peace. Several recent statutes have purported to increase the juris-
diction of the Justices of the Peace to impose sentence for particular
offenses far beyond the maximums permitted by RCW 3.20.040. For
example, RCW 66.44.180, of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,
provides:
"Every justice of the peace and magistrate shall have concurrent juns-
diction with superior court judges of the state for all violations of the
provisions of this title, and may impose any punishment provided therefor."
Similar provisions are found in the Food Fish and Shellfish Act"3 and
Game and Game Fish Act." If statutes such as these are valid, then
the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace to sentence may differ with
the offense charged. A careful search of the Washington statutes should
be made and the attention of all Justices of the Peace should be called
to all provisions increasing, in any respect, the power of the Justices of
the Peace to hear and to sentence.
Fortunately, we have an excellent decision of our Supreme Court,
In re Hulet,5 on the Constitutionality of statutes such as these which
increase the jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace to sentence in special
cases without amending or purporting to amend RCW 3.20.040.
The petitioner, one Hulet, had been charged before a Justice of the
Peace with violation of the prohibition laws. He pleaded guilty and was
sentenced by the Justice to serve ninety days in county jail and to pay
a fine of $600. Our Supreme Court said:
"Petitioner contends that, under the statutes of this state, the jurisdiction
of justices of the peace for precincts other than cities of the first class, under
circumstances similar to those disclosed by the record herein, is limited to
the imposition of a fine not exceeding $100, or a sentence of not to exceed
thirty days in the county jail. Petitioner contends that, in so far as the
18 FOOD FISH AND SHELLFISH RCW 75.08.270 Justice and superior courts have
concurrent jurisdiction. Every justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent
with the superior court of all misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors committed m
violation of the fisheries code and of the rules, regulations, and orders made by the
director in accordance with existing law and to impose any penalty or confiscation
provided for such offenses.
14 GAME AND GAMs FIsH RCW 77.16.240 General penalty-jurisdiction of courts.
Every justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the superior courts
of all misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors committed in violation of the provisions
of this title and may impose any punishment in this title provided for such offenses.
15 159 Wash. 98, 292 Pac. 430 (1930).
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sentence imposed upon him by the justice exceeds these limits, the same
was unlawful, and that petitioner, after serving so much of the sentence
as lies within what he contends is the jurisdiction of the justice, is entitled
to his discharge.***
"Petitioner relies upon the case of State ex rel. Wagner v. Superior
Court. This decision would, indeed, be directly in point were it not for § 14,
chapter 19, Laws of 1917, p. 61, and chapter 122, Laws of 1921, p. 398,
above quoted, which sections purport to vest justices of the peace with
jurisdiction to impose punishments in excess of those provided for by
Rem. Com. Stat., § 46, supra [now RCW 3.20.040]. If the last mentioned
statutes are valid, in so far as they purport to increase the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace, then it follows that the Wagner case is not control-
ling here."
The Supreme Court then proceeded to test the validity of the act
under which Hulet was sentenced against the constitutional require-
ments for valid legislation. The court found that all these requirements
were met, and that, consequently, the statute increasing the power of
the Justice of the Peace to impose sentence was valid in every respect.
In the light of this decision, it is safe to say that our Legislature
may increase the power of the Justices of the Peace to sentence in
special cases without amending the basic limitation. And, when such a
provision becomes law, the Justice of the Peace may impose any
punishment for the particular misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor that
the title establishes, be it fine, imprisonment, both, or even confiscation
of property, without regard to the limitation of RCW 3.20.040.
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